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RealWages
THIS chapter deals with our estimates of real wages, i.e. the money-
wage series of Chapter 3 divided by the cost-of-living index of
Chapter 4.Table44 and Chart 8 present our series for real wages for
TABLE 44
Real Earnings in AllManufacturing,1890—1914
REAL EARNINGS, NBER INDEXES OF REALEARNINGS(1914=100)
(1914 DOLLARS) NBER Douglas
Hourly Daily Hourly Daily HourlyWeekly
1890 $0.158 $1.58 72 77 93 101
1891 0.158 1.58 72 77 97 105
1892 0.160 1.60 72 78 97 105
1893 0.168 1.68 76 82 99 107
1894 0.162 1.61 74 79 100 107
1895 0.165 1.64 75 80 100 107
1896 0.172 1.72 78 84 100 107
1897 0.168 1.67 76 82 98 106
1898 0.166 1.66 75 81 98 106
1899 0.176 1.75 80 86 99 106
1900 0.179 1.77 81 87 99 106
1901 0.185 1.82 84 89 98 105
1902 0.191 1.87 87 91 99 105
1903 0.193 1.88 88 92 98 103
1904 0.190 1.84 86 90 99 104
1905 0.194 1.88 88 92 101 105
1906 0.204 1.96 93 96 101 105
1907 0.203 1.95 92 95 99 103
1908 0.201 1.92 91 94 100 103
1909 0.203 1.94 92 95 101 103
1910 0.209 1.99 95 97 98 101
1911 0.213 2.01 96 98 96 98
1912 0.213 2.00 97 98 100 101
1913 0.224 2.09 102 102 101 101
1914 0.220 2.04 100 100 100 100
SOURCE:Tables 10 and 22 and Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States,
1890—1 926, Boston, 1930, pp. 108 and 130.
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all manufacturing, and compare them with the Douglas series.Our
index of daily earnings is directly comparable with Douglas's index
of full-time weekly earnings, since we regard all changes in the length
of the full-time workweek as changes in hours per day.
The total rise in real hourly earnings from 1890 to 1914 shown by
our series is 40 per cent, compared with a rise of 8 per cent in Doug-
las's. While the Douglasseries reaches its1914 level by1894, ours
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rises throughout the period;it is neverbelow its previous peak for
more than three years.
Our real-wage index has a clear tendency to fall in cyclical contrac-
tions, though it leads the contraction of 1908 by a year. The small
year-to-year movement of the Douglas series often seems random,
but it has some tendency to rise in cyclical contractions. This differ-
ence arises largely from the inclusion of union rates in the Douglas
money-wage series. When the two components of the Douglas series
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Source: See note to Table 44REAL WAGES
are examined separately, it is seen that real hourly earnings in payroll
industries fall in cyclical contractions while real hourly earnings in
union industries rise.
The downward cyclical flexibility of real hourly earnings from 1890
to 1914 is in marked contrast to more recent experience. Since 1929,
real average hourly compensation (earnings plus wage supplements)
in manufacturing has fallen in only three years—from 1931 to 1932
and from 1944 to 1946. The fall from 1945 to 1946 occurred during a
business expansion. There was no decline in 1929—31, 1938, 1949, or
1954.'
Our index of real daily earnings rises more or less steadily from
1890 to 1913, while Douglas's index of real weekly earnings moves
downward from 1893 to 1913. As we have mentioned earlier, the two
Douglas series indicate that workers took all their gains in real hourly
earnings in the form of a shorter workweek and, in addition, between
the mid-1890's and 1913 reduced the consumption of goods and
services per wage earner to get a still shorter workweek. Our indexes
indicate that, at most, 77 per cent of the increase in real hourly earn-
ings from 1890 to 1913 was taken as increased consumption of goods
and services per wage earner, and at least 23 per cent was taken in
increased leisure during the working years.2 This is slightly smaller
than the proportion of gains in real hourly compensation devoted to
increasing leisure since 1929. From 1929 to 1957, about 32 per cent
IThestatements in this paragraph are based on estimates by one of us of real average
compensation (earnings plus wage supplements) per hour of work, presented in Wages,
Prices, Profits, and Productivity, Report of the Fifteenth American Assembly, 1959. For a
technical description of the money compensation component of this series, see New
Measures of Wage-Earner Compensation in Manufacturing, 1914—5 7, New York, NBER,
1960.
2Theportion devoted to increased consumption is obtained by dividing the percen-
tage increase in real daily earnings by the percentage increase in real hourly earnings.
This is equivalent to dividing the actual increase in daily earnings (consumption) by the
potential increase, where the potential increase is the increase in hourly earnings times
the average daily hours at the initial date. The comparison ends with 1913 so that both
starting and ending years will be cyclical peaks, since the final percentages are sensitive
to small changes in the increase in earnings, and hourly earnings were depressed during
the recession of 1914.
The figures shown in the text reflect only the shortening of the full-time workweek and
do not allow for increases in the number of holidays or vacations, paid or unpaid. This is
the reason for the words "at most" and "at least" in the text. Possible increases in
holidays or vacations might be taken into account by comparing the rise in real hourly
earnings with that in real annual earnings. On this basis, 36 per cent of the gain in earn-
ings was used to increase leisure. However, some of the decrease in the number of days
in operation per year from 1890 to 1913 could represent slack demand in 1913 (the cyclical
peak in business activity on a quarterly basis was reached in the first quarter). Thus, the
most that can be said is that the percentage of the increase in real wages used to increase
leisure was between 23 and 36.
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of the gains in real hourly compensation was used to increase
leisure.3 On the assumption that there have been no important changes
in the demand function for leisure, the rough similarity of these per-
centages for the two periods tends to support our estimates of real
wages.
Table 45presentsour series on real hourly earnings by industry.
We find increases in real hourly earnings in every industry from 1890
to 1914, and these increases range in size from 16 per cent in the
leather industry to 56percent in paper and paper products. The two
industries with the smallest increases, leather and dyeing and finishing
textiles, were industries in which there was relatively little growth in
employment. However, for the group as a whole there is no significant
correlation between increase in employment and increase in real
wages.
Our finding that real hourly earnings rose in all the industries
studied again differs from Douglas's findings. He found a fall in real
hourly earnings from 1890 to 1914 in two of six union industries and
three of eight payroll industries. In the extreme case, slaughtering and
meat packing, real hourly earnings fell 14 per cent. Table 46 compares
the changes for the industries common to the two studies.
The rise in real average hourly earnings within industries as shown
in Table 45isusually not as steady as the rise for all manufacturing.
In most industries, a peak is reached in 1893 or 1894 that is not
regained for a number of years. In dyeing and finishing textiles, real
earnings are below the 1893 level until 1906. A more typical case is all
textiles, which regains its 1893 level in 1903. The intervening decade
includes the depression of the 1890's and the initial years of heavy
immigration. The industries with only brief breaks in the rise of real
earnings after 1893 are wool, where the 1893 peak is regained in 1896,
and iron and steel, where it is regained in 1898. In iron and steel there
is a new peak in 1902 that is not regained until 1909.
To compare our data on real wages with productivity data, we have
extended the real-wage series backward one year, using Long's data.
The comparison is made for 1889—1913 so as to eliminate the effect
on all the series of the recession of 1914. We find that the annual rate
of increase in real hourly earnings over the period is 1.3 per cent,
which is the same as that of output per weighted unit of labor and
capital combined for the private domestic economy, as estimated by
3Basedon the estimates cited in note 1. The increase in leisure for this period includes

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Kendrick.4 The rate of increase in output per production-worker
man-hour in manufacturing over the same period was 2.1 per cent.5
The fact that output per man-hour in manufacturing rose more than
the real hourly earnings of production workers implies that the
wage earner's share of manufacturing output declined. This inference
is supported by Solow's more direct study of the wage earner's share
of value added in manufacturing.6 A falling share for wage earners
probably means a rising share for capital, and this might be thought
TABLE 46
Changes in Real Average Hourly





Hosiery and knitgoods +55 + 14
Boots and shoes + 20 + 8
Iron and steela + 42 —2
Foundries and machine shops +25 — 4b
SOURCE: Table 45 and Paul H. Douglas, Real Wages in the United States, 1890—1926,
Boston, 1930, pp. 98 and 104.
a 1892—1914.
b Union rate data for metal trades.
to support the conclusion of Hansen and Rubinow that the lag of
wages behind prices had increased profits. However, we have found
no such lag.
Although this study cannot investigate the causes of changes in
relative shares in manufacturing income, it may be appropriate to
point out that factor proportions were changing in the same direction
as relative shares. Kendrick has reported a sharp rise in capital-output
ratios in manufacturing during the period. One plausible interpreta-
tion of the rising share of capital is therefore that this larger share
was needed to cover the costs of using more capital and to sustain the
4 See John W. Kendrick, Productivity Trends in theUnited States (tobe published by
Princeton University Press for the NBER).
5Thisestimate is based on Kendrick's index of manufacturing output, Fabricant's
estimates of production worker employment in manufacturing, and the series on days in
operation and average daily hours presented in this study. The man-hours are thus
identical with those underlying the estimates of average hourly earnings.
6RobertM. Solow, "The Constancy of Relative Shares," AmericanEconomic Review,
September 1958, p. 627.
125REAL WAGES
inflow of capital to the manufacturing sector over a long period. This
is, however, not the only possible interpretation.7
What, then, of the idea that immigration held down real wages
during the period? The finding of an increase in real wages in no way
denies the importance of immigration. We have seen that the wave
of heavy immigration that began in 1900 coincided with a sharp rise
in our rent index, and that during this wave our real wage measures
for a number of industries remained below their previous peaks for
several years. In a larger sense, immigration was probably an impor-
tant factor in keeping both the rate of increase in real wages and in
productivity during this period below the rates achieved more
recently.8
It is, of course, reasonable that the assimilation of the massive
immigration of 1900—1914 should retard the growth of real wages.
Not only were the new immigrants less skilled, on the whole, than the
native born, but the shift in the sources of immigration from northern
and western Europe to southern and eastern Europe meant that they
were, on the whole, less skilled and less literate than were the new
immigrants of earlier periods. But, in reckoning productivity, so long
as we measure labor inputs in man-hours and not in units of constant
quality, these arguments suggest a retardation in the growth of pro-
ductivity as much as in real wages. There undoubtedly were individual
cases in which employers took advantage of the ignorance of immi-
grants to pay them less than their worth, but such cases could hardly
drive a huge wedge between the movements of productivity and real
wages for a large sector of the economy.
We conclude that the accepted view that real wages did not rise in
the quarter century before World War I is largely the product of
faulty statistics. Since our measures of money wages differ from
previous ones principally in level and very little in movement, the
fault in the earlier indexes of real wages lies largely on the cost-of-
living side.
7Weare grateful to Zvi Griliches for persuading us to modify an earlier, more dog-
matic version of this passage. This does not imply his agreement with the present version.
It has been assumed in the text that supplies of factors to a sector of the economy are
quite elastic over long periods so that the effects on income shares of changes in factor
proportions are not fully offset by opposite shifts in factor prices. If factors receive their
marginal products, this amounts to assuming that the production function for a sector
over a long period is not a fixed Cobb-Douglas function.
8For1929—57, one of us has estimated the increase in real hourly compensation of
manufacturing wage earners at 3.5 per cent a year and the increase in output per pro-
duction-worker man-hour in manufacturing at 2.7 per cent a year. See Wages, Prices,
Profits, and Productivity, p. 24.
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This study has not examined real wage statistics for any country
except the United States. However, since the cost-of-living indexes
for the United Kingdom before World War I have the same kinds of
defects as the accepted indexes for the United States, it might well be
worth while to re-examine also the conclusion that real wages in the
United Kingdom were unchanged from 1890 to 1913.
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